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Abstract. Process calculi are expressive specification languages for con-
currency. They have been very successful in two research strands: (a) the
analysis of security protocols and (b) the enforcement of correct message-
passing programs. Despite their shared foundations, languages and rea-
soning techniques for (a) and (b) have been separately developed. Here
we connect two representative calculi from (a) and (b): we encode a
(high-level) π-calculus for multiparty sessions into a (low-level) applied
π-calculus for security protocols. We establish the correctness of our
encoding, and we show how it enables the integrated analysis of security
properties and communication correctness by re-using existing tools.
1 Introduction
This paper connects two distinct formal models of communicating systems: a
process language for the analysis of security protocols [12], and a process language
for session-based concurrency [9,10]. They are representative of two separate
research strands:
(a) Process models for security protocols, such as [12] (see also [7]), rely on vari-
ants of the applied π-calculus [1] to establish properties related to process
execution (e.g., secrecy and confidentiality). These models support cryp-
tography and term passing, but lack support for high-level communication
structures.
(b) Process models for session-based communication, such as [10] (see also
[11]), use π-calculus variants equipped with type systems to enforce cor-
rect message-passing programs. Security extensions of these models target
properties such as information flow and access control (cf. [2]), but usually
abstract away from cryptography.
We present a correct encoding that connects two calculi from these two strands:
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– A, a (low-level) applied π-calculus in which processes explicitly describe term
communication, cryptographic operations, and state manipulation [12];
– S, a (high-level) π-calculus in which communication actions are organized as
multiparty session protocols [5,10].
Our aim is to exploit the complementary strenghts of A and S to analyze commu-
nicating systems that feature high-level communication structures (as in session-
based concurrency [9,10]) and use cryptographic operations and global state in
protocol exchanges.
Our encoding of S into A describes how the structures typical of session-based,
asynchronous concurrency can be compiled down, in a behavior-preserving man-
ner, as process implementations in which communication of terms takes place
exploiting rich equational theories and global state. To our knowledge, ours is
the first work to relate process calculi for the analysis of communication-centric
programs (S) and of security protocols (A), as developed in disjoint research
strands.
We believe our results shed light on both (a) and (b). In one direction,
they define a new way to reason about multiparty session processes. Process
specifications in S can now integrate cryptographic operations and be ana-
lyzed by (re)using existing methods. In fact, since A processes can be faith-
fully translated into multiset rewriting rules using SAPIC [12] (which can
in turn be fed into the Tamarin prover [14]), our encoding bridges the gap
between S processes and toolsets for the analysis of security properties:
Session π-calculus (S)
High-level Protocol Structures
Applied π-calculus (A)
Term Passing / Global State
Multiset Rewrite Rules
(Input to Tamarin)
[14]This paper
Interestingly, this connection can help to enforce communication correctness: we
show how SAPIC/Tamarin can check local formulas representing local session
types [10].
In the other direction, our approach allows us to enrich security protocol
specifications with communication structures based on sessions. This is relevant
because the analysis of security protocols is typically carried out on models
such as, e.g., Horn clauses and rewriting rules, which admit efficient analysis
but that lead to too low-level specifications. Our developments fit well in this
context, as the structures intrinsic to session-based concurrency can conveniently
describe communicating systems in which security protocols appear intertwined
with higher-level interaction protocols.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Two-
Buyer Contract Signing Protocol, a protocol that is representative of the kind
of systems that is hard to specify using S or A alone. Section 3 recalls the
definitions of S and A, and also introduces S, which is a variant of S that is
useful in our developments. Section 4 defines the encoding of S into A, using S as
stepping stone, and establishes its correctness (Theorems 1, 2, and 3). Section 5
shows how our encoding can be used to reduce the enforcement of protocol
conformance in S to the model checking of local formulas for A (Theorems 4
and 5). Section 6 revisits the Two-Buyer Contract Signing Protocol: we illustrate
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Fig. 1. The trusted Buyers-Seller protocol.
its process specification using S minimally extended with constructs from A,
and show how key correctness properties can be mechanically verified using
SAPIC/Tamarin. The paper closes by discussing related works and collecting
concluding remarks (Sect. 7). Additional technical material and further examples
are given in an appendix available online [15].
2 A Motivating Example: The Trusted Buyers-Seller
Protocol
The Trusted Buyers-Seller Protocol extends the Two-Buyer Protocol [10], and
proceeds in two phases. The first phase follows the global session type in [10],
which offers a unified description of the way in which two buyers (B1 and B2)
interact to purchase a book from a seller (S). In the second phase, once B1
and B2 agree in the terms of the purchase, the role of S is delegated to a
trusted third party (T ), which creates a contract for the transaction and collects
the participants’ signatures. This second phase relies on the contract signing
protocol [8], which may resolve conflicts (due to unfulfilled promises from B1
and B2) and abort the conversation altogether. In this protocol, one key security
property is authentication, which ensures that an attacker cannot impersonate
Bi, S, or T . Relevant properties of communication correctness include fidelity
and safety : while the former ensures that processes for Bi, S, and T follow
the protocols specified by global/local types, the latter guarantees that such
82 D. Nantes and J. A. Pe´rez
processes do not get into errors at runtime. The protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1
and described next:
First Phase. B1, B2, and S start by establishing a session, after execut-
ing the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) authentication protocol. Subsequently,
they interact as follows:
1. B1 sends the book title to S. Then, S replies back to both B1 and B2 the
quote for the title. Subsequently, B1 tells B2 how much he can contribute.
2. If the amount is within B2’s budget, then he accepts to perform the transac-
tion, informs B1 and S, and awaits the contract signing phase. Otherwise, if
the amount offered by B1 is not enough, B2 informs S and B1 his intention
to abort the protocol.
3. Once B1 and B2 have agreed upon the purchase, S will delegate the session
to the trusted party T , which will lead the contract signing phase. Upon
completion of this phase, S (implemented by T ) sends B1 the delivery date
for the book.
Second Phase. At this point, the trusted authority T , B1, and B2 interact as
follows:
4. T creates a new contract ct and a new memory cell s, useful to record infor-
mation about the contract. T sends the contract ct to B1 and B2 for them
to sign. T can start replying to the following requests: success (in case of
successful communication), abort (request to abort the protocol), or resolve
(request to solve a conflict).
5. Upon reception of contract ct from T , B1 sends to B2 his promise to sign it.
Subsequently, B1 expects to receive B2’s promise:
• If B1 receives a valid response from B2, his promise is converted into a
signature (〈signature1〉), which is sent back. Now, B1 expects to receive a
valid signature from B2: if this occurs, B1 sends to T a success message;
otherwise, B1 sends T a resolve request, which includes the promise by
B2 and his own signature.
• If B1 does not receive a valid promise from B2, then B1 asks T to cancel
the purchase (an abort request), including his own promise (〈promise1〉)
in the request.
6. Upon reception of contract ct from T , B2 checks whether he obtained a valid
promise from B1; in that case, B2 replies by sending his promise to sign it
(〈promise2〉). Now, B2 expects to receive B1’s signature on ct: if the response
is valid, B2 sends its own signature (〈signature2〉) to B1; otherwise, B2 asks T
to resolve. If B2 does not receive a valid promise, then it aborts the protocol.
Clearly, S and A offer complementary advantages in modeling and analyzing
the Trusted Buyers-Seller Protocol. On the one hand, S can represent high-level
structures that are typical in the design of multiparty communication protocols.
Such structures are essential in, e.g., the exchanges that follow session establish-
ment in the first phase (which involves a step of session delegation to bridge with
the second phase) and the handling of requests success, abort and resolve in
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the second phase. Hence, S and its type-based verification techniques can be
used to establish fidelity and safety properties. However, S is not equipped with
constructs for directly representing cryptographic operations, as indispensable
in, e.g., the NSL protocol for session establishment and in the exchanges of sig-
natures/promises in the contract sigining phase. The lack of these constructs
prevents the formal analysis of authentication properties. On the other hand,
A compensates for the shortcomings of S, for it can directly represent crypto-
graphic operations on exchanged messages, as required to properly model the
contract signing phase and, ultimately, to establish authentication. While A can
represent the high-level communication structures mentioned above, it offers a
too low-level representation of them, which makes reasoning about fidelity and
safety more difficult than in S.
Our encoding from S into A, given in Sect. 4, will serve to combine the
individual strengths of both languages. In Sect. 6, we will revisit this exam-
ple: we will give a process specification using an extension of S with some con-
structs from A. This is consistent, because A is a low-level process language,
and our encoding will define how to correctly compile S down to A (constructs
from A will be treated homomorphically). Moreover, we will show how to use
SAPIC/Tamarin to verify that implementations for B1, B2, S, and T respect
their intended local types.
3 Two Process Models: A and S
3.1 The Applied π- Calculus (A)
Preliminaries. As usual in symbolic protocol analysis, messages are modelled
by abstract terms (t, t′, . . .). We assume a countably infinite set of variables V, a
countably infinite set of names N = PN∪FN (FN for fresh names, PN for public
names), and a signature Σ (a set of function symbols, each with its arity).
We denote by TΣ the set of well-sorted terms built over Σ, N , and V. The set
of ground terms (i.e., terms without variables) is denoted MΣ . A substitution is
a partial function from variables to terms. We denote by σ = {t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn}
the substitution whose domain is Dom(σ) = {x1, . . . , xn}. We say σ is grounding
for t if tσ is ground. We equip the term algebra with an equational theory =E ,
which is the smallest equivalence relation containing identities in E, a finite set
of pairs the form M = N where M,N ∈ TΣ , that is closed under application of
function symbols, renaming of names, and substitution of variables by terms of
the same sort. Furthermore, we require E to distinguish different fresh names,
i.e., ∀a, b ∈ FN : a = b ⇒ a =E b.
Given a set S, we write S∗ and S# to denote the sets of finite sequences of
elements and of finite multisets of elements from S. We use the superscript #
to annotate the usual multiset operations, e.g., S1 ∪#S2 denotes the union of
multisets S1, S2. Application of substitutions is extended to sets, multisets, and
sequences as expected.
The set of facts is F := {F (t1, . . . , tk)| ti ∈ TΣ , F ∈ Σfact of arity k},
where Σfact is an unsorted signature, disjoint from Σ. Facts will be used to
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Table 1. Syntax of A: terms and processes.
M,N ::= x, y | p | n | f(M1, . . . ,Mn) (f ∈ Σ)
P,Q ::= 0 | out(M,N);P | in(M,N);P | P | Q | !P | νn;P |
insert((M,N));P | delete M ;P | lookupM asx inP elseQ |
lock M ;P | unlock M ;P | event F ;P | if M = N then P else Q
annotate protocols (via events) and to define multiset rewrite rules. A fixed
set of fact symbols will be used to encode the adversary’s knowledge, freshness
information, and the messages on the network. The remaining fact symbols are
used to represent the protocol state. For instance, fact K(m) denotes that m is
known by the adversary.
Syntax and Semantics. The grammar for terms (M,N) and processes (P,Q),
given in Table 1, follows [12]. In addition to usual operators for concurrency, repli-
cation, and name creation, the calculus A inherits from the applied π-calculus [1]
input and output constructs in which terms appear both as communication sub-
jects and objects. Also, A includes a conditional construct based on term equality,
as well as constructs for reading from and updating an explicit global state:
– insert((M,N));P first binds the value N to a key M and then proceeds as P .
Successive inserts may modify this binding; delete M ;P simply “undefines”
the mapping for the key M and proceeds as P .
– lookupM asx inP elseQ retrieves the value associated to M , binding it to
variable x in P . If the mapping is undefined for M then the process behaves
as Q.
– lock M ;P and unlock M ;P allow to gain and release exclusive access to a
resource/key M , respectively, and to proceed as P afterwards. These opera-
tions are essential to specify parallel processes that may read/update a com-
mon memory.
Moreover, the construct event F ;P adds F ∈ F to a multiset of ground facts
before proceeding as P . These facts will be used in the transition semantics for
A, which is defined by a labelled relation between process configurations of the
form (E ,S,P, σ,L), where: P is a multiset of ground processes representing the
processes executed in parallel; E ⊆ FN is the set of fresh names generated by
the processes; S : MΣ → MΣ is a partial function modeling stored information
(state); σ is a ground substitution modeling the messages sent to the environ-
ment; and L ⊆ MΣ is the set of currently acquired locks. We write S(M) = ⊥
to denote that there is no information stored for M in S. Also, notation L\M
stands for the set L\{M ′|M ′ =E M}.
We also require the notions of frame and a deduction relation. A frame νn˜.σ
consists of a set of fresh names n˜ and a substitution σ: it represents the sequence
of messages that have been observed by an adversary during a protocol execution
and secrets n˜ generated by the protocol, a priori unknown to the adversary.
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Table 2. Deduction rules for A. In rule [Appl]: ˜t = (t1, . . . , tn).
a ∈ (FN∪ PN) \ n˜
[Name]
νn˜.σ  a
νn˜.σ  t t =E t′ [Eq]
νn˜.σ  t′
x ∈ Dom(σ)
[Frame]
νn˜.σ  xσ
νn˜.σ  ti [App]
νn˜.σ  f t˜
Table 3. Operational semantics for A.
Standard Operations
(E,S,P ∪# {0}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P, σ,L)
(E,S,P∪#{P | Q}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{P,Q}, σ,L)
(E,S,P∪#{!P}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P ∪# {!P, P}, σ,L)
(E,S,P∪#{νa;P}, σ,L) −→A
(E ∪ {a′},S,P∪#{P{a′/a}}, σ,L) C0
(E,S,P, σ,L) K(M)−−−−→A (E,S,P, σ,L) C1
(E,S,P∪#{out(M,N);P}, σ,L) K(M)−−−−→A
(E,S,P ∪#{P}, σ∪{N/x},L) C2
(E,S,P ∪#{in(M,N);P}, σ,L) K(〈M,Nτ〉)−−−−−−−−→A (E,S,P ∪#{Pτ}, σ,L) C3
(E,S,P∪#{out(M,N);P, in(M ′, N ′);Q}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P ∪#{P,Qτ}, σ,L) C4
(E,S,P ∪# {if M = N then P else Q}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{P}, σ,L) C5
(E,S,P∪#{if M = N then P else Q}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{Q}, σ,L) C6
(E,S,P ∪# {event F ;P}, σ,L) F−−→A (E,S,P∪#{P}, σ,L)
Operations on Global State
(E,S,P∪#{insert((M,N));P}, σ,L) −→A (E,S[M → N ],P∪#{P}, σ,L)
(E,S,P∪#{delete M ;P}, σ,L) −→A (E,S[M ⊥→ ],P∪#{P}, σ,L)
(E,S,P∪#{lookupM asx inP elseQ}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{P{V/x}}, σ,L) C7
(E,S,P∪#{lookupM asx inP elseQ}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{Q}, σ,L) C8
(E,S,P∪#{lock M ;P}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{P}, σ,L ∪ {M}) C9
(E,S,P∪#{unlock M ;P}, σ,L) −→A (E,S,P∪#{P}, σ,L\M)
where:
C0: if a′ fresh C5: if M =E N
C1: if νE.σ  M C6: if M =E N
C2: if x is fresh, νE.σ  M C7: if ∃N.N=E M and S(N)=E V
C3: if ∃τ.νE.σ  M and νE.σ  Nτ and τ grounding for N C8: if ∀N.N =E M ⇒ S(N) = ⊥
C4: if M =E M ′ and ∃τ.N =E N ′τ and τ grounding for N ′ C9: if M /∈E L
The deduction relation νn˜.σ  t models the adversary’s ability to compute new
messages from observed ones: it is the smallest relation between frames and
terms defined by the rules in Table 2.
Transitions are of the form (E ,S,P, σ,L) F−−→A (E ′,S ′,P ′, σ′,L′), where F is
a set of ground facts (see Table 3). We write −−→A for ∅−−→A and f−−→A for {f}−−−→A.
As usual, −−→∗A denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of −−→A. Transitions
denote either standard process operations or operations on the global state;
they are sometimes denoted −−→AP and −−→AS , respectively.
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Table 4. Process syntax and naming conventions for S.
u ::= x | a (Identifiers) n ::= s | a (Names) e ::= v | x | e = e′ | . . . (Expressions)
c ::= s[p] | x (Channels) v ::= a | true | false | s[p] (Values)
m ::= (q  p :v) | (q  p :c) | (q  p : l) (Messages)
P ::= u[p](y).P (Req)
| u[p](y).P (Acc)
| c!〈p, e〉.P (Send)
| c?(p, x).P (Recv)
| c!〈〈p, c〉〉.P (Deleg)
| c?((q, y)).P (Recep)
| c ⊕ 〈p, l〉.P (Select)
| c&(p, {li : Pi}i∈I) (Branch)
| if e then P else Q (Condit.)
| P |Q (Parallel)
| 0 (Inaction)
| (νn)P (N.Hiding)
| s[p˜] : h (M. Queue)
h ::= h·m | ∅ (Queue)
3.2 Multiparty Session Processes (S)
Syntax. The syntax of processes, ranged over by P,Q, . . . and that of expres-
sions, ranged over by e, e′, . . ., is given by the grammar of Table 4, which also
shows name conventions. We assume two disjoint countable set of names: one
ranges over shared names a, b, . . . and another ranges over session names s, s′, . . ..
Variables range over x, y, . . .; participants (or roles) range over the naturals and
are denoted as p, q, p′, . . .; labels range over l, l′, . . . and constants range over
true, false, . . .. We write p˜ to denote a finite sequence of participants p1, . . . , pn
(and similarly for other elements). Given a session name s and a participant p,
we write s[p] to denote a (session) endpoint.
The intuitive meaning of processes is as in [5,10]. The processes u[p](y).P
and u[p](y).Q can respectively request and accept to initiate a session through
a shared name u. In both processes, the bound variable y is the placeholder
for the channel that will be used in communications. After initiating a session,
each channel placeholder will replaced by an endpoint of the form s[pi] (i.e.,
the runtime channel of pi in session s). Within an established session, process
may send and receive basic values or session names (session delegation) and
select and offer labeled, deterministic choices (cf. constructs c ⊕ 〈p, l〉.P and
c&(p, {li : Pi}i∈I)). The input/output operations (including delegation) specify
the channel and the sender or the receiver, respectively.
Message queues model asynchronous communication. A message (p  q : v)
indicates that p has sent a value v to q. The empty queue is denoted by ∅. By
h ·m we denote the queue obtained by concatenating message m to the queue h.
By s[p˜] : h we denote the queue h of the session s initiated between participants
p˜ = p1, . . . , pn; when the participants are clear from the context we shall write
s : h instead of s[p˜] : h.
Request/accept actions bind channel variables, value receptions bind value
variables, channel receptions bind channel variables, hidings bind shared and
session names. In (νs)P all occurrences of s[p] and queue s inside P are bound.
We denote by fn(Q) the set of free names in Q. A process is closed if it does
not contain free variables or free session names. Unless stated otherwise, we only
consider closed processes.
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Table 5. Structural congruence for S processes.
P | 0 ≡ P P | Q ≡ Q | P (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (νa)0 ≡ 0 (νs)(s : ∅) ≡ 0
(νr)P | Q ≡ (νr)(P | Q), if r /∈ fn(Q) (νr)(νr′)P ≡ (νr′)(νr)P, where r ::= a | s
s[p˜] :h · (q  p :ζ) · (q′  p′ :ζ′) · h′ ≡ s[p] :h · (q′  p′ :ζ′) · (q  p :ζ) · h′, if p = p′ or q = q′
Table 6. Reduction rules for S (Rule [If-F] omitted).
a[p1](y)P1 | . . . | a[pn−1](y)Pn−1 | a[pn](y).Pn −→S [Init]
(νs)(P1{s[p1]/y} | . . . | Pn−1{s[pn−1]/y} | Pn{s[pn]/y} | s[p˜] : ∅)
s[p]!〈q, e〉.P | s : h −→S P | s :h·(p  q :v) (e ↓ v) [Send]
s[p]!〈〈q, s′[p′]〉〉.P | s : h −→S P | s :h · (p  q :s′[p′]) [Deleg]
s[p] ⊕ 〈q, l〉.P | s : h −→S P | s :h·(p  q : l) [Sel]
s[p]?(q, x).P | s : (q  p :v)·h −→S P{v/x} | s[p˜] :h [Recv]
s[p]?((q, y)).P | s : (q  p :s′[p′]) · h −→S P{s′[p′]/y} | s[p˜] :h [SRecv]
s[p] &(q, {li : Pi}i∈I) | s : (q  p : lj)·h −→S Pj | s : h (j ∈ I) [Branch]
if e then P else Q −→S P (e ↓ true ) [If-T]
P ≡ P ′ and P ′ −→S Q′ andQ ≡ Q′ ⇒ P −→S Q [Str]
P −→S P ′ ⇒ E[P ] −→S E[P ′] [Ctx]
Semantics. S processes are governed by a reduction semantics, which relies on
a structural congruence relation, denoted ≡ and defined by adding α-conversion
to the rules of Table 5. Reduction rules are given in Table 6; we write P −→S
P ′ for a reduction step. We rely on the following syntax for contexts: E ::=
[ ] | P | (νa)E | (νs)E | E | E.
We briefly discuss the reduction rules. Rule [Init] describes the initiation of
a new session among n participants that synchronize over the shared name a.
After session initiation, the participants will share a private session name (s in
the rule), and an empty queue associated to it (s[p˜] : ∅ in the rule). Rules [Send],
[Deleg] and [Sel] add values, channels and labels, respectively, into the message
queue; in Rule [Send], e ↓ v denotes the evaluation of the expression e into a
value v. Rules [Recv], [SRecv] and [Branch] perform complementary de-queuing
operations. Other rules are self-explanatory.
3.3 The Calculus S
We now introduce S, a variant of S which will simplify the definition of our
encoding into A. The syntax of S processes is as follows:
P,Q ::= 0 | u[p](y˜).P | u[p](y˜).P | P | Q | (νn)P | if e then P else Q
| cpq!〈e : msg〉.P | cpq?((y)).P | cpq?(x).P | cpq!〈〈c′p′q′ : chan〉〉.P |
| cpq ⊕ 〈l : lbl〉.P | cpq &({li : Pi}i∈I) | spq : h
where cpq denotes a channel annotated with participant identities, h ::=h·m | ∅
and m ::= 〈msg, v〉 | 〈chan, spq〉 | 〈lbl, l〉. The main differences between S and S
are:
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– Intra-session communication relies on annotated channels, and output pre-
fixes include a sort for the communicated messages (msg for values, chan for
delegated sessions, lbl for labels).
– While S uses a single queue per session, in S for each pair of participants
there will be two queues, one in each direction. This simplifies the definition
of structural congruence ≡ for S, which results from that for S as expected
and is omitted.
– Constructs for session request and acceptance in S depend on a sequence
of variables, rather than on a single variable. In these constructs, denoted
u[p](y˜).P and u[p](y˜).P , respectively, y˜ is a sequence of variables of the form
ypq, for some p, q.
With these differences in mind, the reduction semantics for S, denoted −→S ,
follows that for S (Table 6). Reduction rules for S include the following:
a[1](y˜1).P1 | . . . | a[n − 1](y˜n−1).Pn−1 | a[n](y˜n).Pn −→S [Init∗]
(νs)(P1{s/y} | . . . | Pn−1{s/y} | Pn{s/y} | y˜1{s/y} : ∅ | . . . | y˜n{s/y} : ∅)
ypq!〈e : msg〉.P | ypq : h −→S P | ypq : h · 〈msg, v〉 (e ↓ v) [Send∗]
ypq?(x).P | yqp : 〈msg, v〉 · h −→S P{v/x} | yqp : h [Recv∗]
Notice that in Rule [Init∗], we only need to write Pi{s/y}: after reduction,
these variables will be of the form spq. In that rule, each y˜i{s/y} : ∅ denotes
several queues (one for each name ypq ∈ y˜i), rather than a single queue.
It is straightforward to define an auxiliary encoding ([ · ]) : S → S. For
instance:
([s[p]!〈q, e〉.P ]) = spq!〈e : msg〉.([P ]) ([s[p]?(q, x).P ]) = sqp?(x).([P ])
([s[p]!〈〈q, zp′〉〉.P ]) = spq!〈〈zp′ : chan〉〉.([P ]) ([s[p]?((q, x)).P ]) = sqp?((x)).([P ])
The full encoding, given in [15], enjoys the following property:
Theorem 1. Let P ∈ S. Then: (a) If P −→S P ′, then ([P ]) −→S ([P ′]).
(b) If ([P ]) −→S R, then there exists P ′ ∈ S such that P −→S P ′ and ([P ′]) = R.
Given the encoding ([·]) : S → S and Theorem 1 above, we now move on to define
an encoding · : S∗ → A. By composing these encodings (and their correctness
results—Theorems 2 and 3), we will obtain a behavioral-preserving compiler of
S into A.
4 Encoding S into A
We now present our encoding · : S∗ → A and establish its correct-
ness. The encoding is defined in Table 7; it uses the set of facts FS =
{honest, sndnonce, rcvnonce, sndchann, rcvchann, out, inp, dels, recs, sel, bra, close} .
Facts will be used as event annotations in process executions, and also for model
checking communication correctness via trace formulas in the following section.
Our encoding will rely on the equational theory for pairing, which is embedded
in Tamarin prover [14], and includes function symbols 〈 , 〉, fst and snd, for
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Table 7. Encoding from S to A.
pairing and projection of first and second parameters of a pair. Communication
within a secure established session is expressed by the manipulation of queues,
which will be stored in the set of states S. In SAPIC, we implement queues ypq
and yqp as q(y, p, q) and q(y, q, p), respectively, where q is a function symbol for
queues. Also, spq : ∅ is implemented as insert((spq, init)).
Session Initiation. The (high-level) mechanism of session initiation of Rule [Init]
in S (Table 6) is implemented in A by following the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
(NSL) authentication protocol [13]; see Table 7 (top). We use NSL because
it is simple, and it has already been formalized in SAPIC. For simplicity,
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we present the implementation for three participants; the extension to n partic-
ipants is as expected. The encoding creates queues for intra-session communi-
cation using processes insert((s˜ij , ∅)). The security verification uses the built-
in library asymmetric-encryption available in Tamarin [14], and assumes the
usual signature and equational theory for public keys pk, secret keys sk, asym-
metric encryption aenc and decryption dec.
Intra-session Communication. Process cpq!〈e : msg〉.P  first acquires a lock in
the queue cpq to avoid interference. Then, a lookup as process checks the state
of cpq and enqueues message 〈msg, v〉 at its end. Finally, the encoding signals this
operation by executing event out(cpq, v) before unlocking cpq and proceeding as
as P . The encoding of session delegation cpq!〈〈c : chan〉〉.P  is very similar: the
only differences are the sort of the communicated object and the event signaled
at the end (dels(cpq, c′)).
As above, process cpq?(x).P  first acquires a lock and checks the queue cqp.
If it is of the form 〈msg,−〉 then it stores it in a variable zv: it consumes the
first part (fst(zv)) and updates cqp with the second part. The implementation
then signals an event event inp(cpq, zv) before unlocking cqp and proceeding as
P . Process cpq?((x)).P  (reception of a delegated session) is similar; in this
case, the queue should contain a value of sort chan and the associated event is
recs(cpq, fst(zv)).
Process 0 simply executes an event close. In the prototype SAPIC imple-
mentation of our encoding, this event mentions the name of the corresponding
session cqp.
Finally, process cpq : h is 0 because we implement queues using the
global state in A. The implementation of the remaining constructs in A is self-
explanatory.
Remark 1. Since our encoding operates on untyped processes, we could have
sort mismatches in queues (cf. Rule [If-F]). To avoid this, encodings of input-like
processes (e.g., spq?(x).P ), use the input of a dummy value that allows processes
to reduce.
Correctness of ·. We first associate to each ground process P ∈ S∗ a process
configuration via the encoding in Table 7. Below we assume that s˜, I, and I ′
may be empty, allowing the encoding of communicating processes (obtained after
session initiation); we also assume that the set of (free) variables in P (denoted
var(P )) can be instantiated with ground terms that can be deduced from the
current frame.
Definition 1 Suppose an S process R ≡ (νs)(∏i∈I Pi |
∏
j,k∈I′ spjqk : hj,k),
with var(R) = {x1, . . . , xn}. A process configuration for R, denoted C[R], is
defined as:
(E∪{s},S ∪ {spjqk : hj,k | j, k ∈ I ′},
{
∏
i∈I
Pi
}
, σ,L),
where var(R) ⊆ dom(σ) and σ is grounding for xi, i = 1, . . . , n.
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With some abuse of notation we say that C is a process configuration for
R. Observe that different process configurations C,C ′, . . . can be associated to
a same process R ∈ S once one considers variations of E ,S, σ,L.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let P ∈ S. If P −→S P ′ then for all process
configuration C, there exists a process configuration C ′ such that C[P ] −−→∗A
C ′[P ′].
Proof. The proof is by structural induction, analyzing the rule applied in
P −→S P ′ via encoding in Table 7 and the rules in Table 3. See [15] for details.
unionsq
To prove soundness, we rely on a Labeled Transition System for S, denoted
P
λ−→ P ′. Such an LTS, and the proof of the theorem below, can be found in [15].
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Let P ∈ S and C be such that C[P ] −−→AP R.
Then there exist P ′ ∈ S, a C ′, and λ such that R −−→∗A C ′[P ′] and P λ−→ P ′.
5 Multiparty Session Types and Their Local Formulas
Using ([ · ]) and ·, in this section we connect well-typedness of processes in
S [10] with the satisfiability of local formulas, which model the execution of A
processes.
5.1 Global and Local Types
Rather than defining multiparty session types for A processes, we would like
to model checking local types by re-using existing tools for A: SAPIC [12] and
Tamarin [14]. Concretely, next we shall connect typability for S processes with
satifiability for A processes. To formalize these results, we first recall some essen-
tial notions for multiparty session types; the reader is referred to [5,10] for an
in-depth presentation.
Global types G,G′ describe multiparty session protocols from a vantage point;
they offer a complete perspective on how two or more participants should inter-
act. On the other hand, local (session) types T, T ′ describe how each participant
contributes to the multiparty protocol. A projection function relates global and
local types: the projection of G onto participant n is denoted G|n. The syntax for
global and local types, given in Table 8 is standard [10]. A complete description
of session types can found in [15].
Example 1. Figure 2 gives three global types for the protocol in Sect. 2: while
Ginit represents the first phase, both Gcontract and Gsign are used to represent
the second. In Gsign, we use Gresolvei to denote a global protocol for resolving
conflicts; see [15] for details.
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Table 8. Global and local types [10].
S ::= bool | nonce | msg | temp | . . . | G Sorts U ::= S | T Exchange Types
(Global Types)G ::= p → q : 〈U〉.G | p → q : {li : Gi}i∈I | end
(Local Types) T ::=!〈p, U〉.T | ?(p, U).T | ⊕ 〈p, {li : Ti}〉 | &(p, {li : Ti}) | end
Ginit : (I.1) 3 → 1 : 〈Title〉
(I.2) 1 → {2, 3} : 〈quote〉
(I.3) 3 → 2 : 〈quote’〉
(I.4) 2 → {1, 3} :
{
ok : Gcontract
¬ok : end
Gb :
(1′) 1 → 2 : 〈T 〉
T = (Gcontract)|1
Gcontract : (c.1) 1 → {2, 3} : 〈contract〉
(c.2) 3 → 2 : 〈promise〉
(c.3) 2 → 3 :
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ok : 2 → 3 : 〈promise〉
3 → 2 :
{
ok : Gsign
¬ok : 3 → 1 : abort
¬ok : end
Gsign : (s.1) 3 → 2 : 〈signature1〉
(s.1) 2 → 3 :
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ok : 2 → 3 : 〈signature2〉
3 → 1 :
⎧⎨
⎩
success : 3 → 1 : 〈address〉
1 → 3 : 〈date〉
¬success : 1 → 3 : Gresolve1
¬ok : 2 → 1 : Gresolve2
Fig. 2. Global Types for the Trusted Buyer-Seller Protocol (Sect. 2).
Typing judgements for expressions and processes are of the form Γ  e : S
or Γ  P Δ, where Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : S and Δ ::= ∅ | Δ, c : T . The standard envi-
ronment Γ assigns variables to sorts and service names to closed global types;
the session environment Δ associates channels to local types. We write Γ, x : S
only if x /∈ dom(Γ ), where dom(Γ ) denotes the domain of Γ . We adopt the same
convention for a : G and c : T , and write Δ,Δ′ only if dom(Δ) ∩ dom(Δ′) = ∅.
Typing rules are as in [5,10]; as discussed in those works, typability for S pro-
cesses ensure communication correctness in terms of session fidelity (well-typed
processes respect prescribed local protocols) and communication safety (well-
typed processes do not feature communication errors), among other properties.
5.2 Satisfiability of Local Formulas from A
Following the approach in [12], properties of processes in A will be established via
analysis of traces, which describe the possible executions of a process. This will
allow us to prove communication correctness of S processes, using encoding ·.
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Definition 1 (Traces of P [12]). Given a ground process P ∈ A, we define the
set of traces of P , denoted by traces(P ), as
traces(P ) =
{
[F1, . . . , Fn]
∣
∣ (∅, {P}, ∅, ∅) F1===⇒ . . . Fn===⇒ (En,Sn,Pn, σn,Ln)
}
We will denote by trP , a trace from a set traces(P ), for some process P . We
will write tr when P is clear from the context. Notice that, trP = trQ does
not necessarily imply that P = Q: each process may implement more than one
session in different ways.
SAPIC and Tamarin [14] consider two sorts: temp and msg. Each variable of
sort s will be interpreted in the domain D(s); in particular, we will denote by
Vtemp the set of temporal variables, which is interpreted in the domain D(temp) =
Q; also, Vmsg is the set of message variables, which is interpreted in the domain
D(msg) = M. Below, we will adopt a function θ : V → M ∪ Q that maps
variables to terms respecting the variable’s sorts, that is θ(x : s) ∈ D(s).
Definition 2 (Trace atoms [12]). A trace atom has of one of the forms:
A ::=⊥ | t1 ≈ t2 | i  j | i .= k | F@i
denoting, respectively, false, term equality, timepoint ordering, timepoint equal-
ity, or an action for a fact F and a timepoint i. The construction of trace formula
ϕ respects the usual first-order convention:
ϕ,ψ ::=A | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ → ψ | ϕ ↔ ψ | (∃x : s).ϕ | (∀x : s).ϕ
Given a process P , in the definition below, tr denotes a trace in traces(P ),
idx(tr) denotes the positions in tr, and tri denotes the i-th position in tr.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction relation [12]). The satisfaction relation (tr, θ)  ϕ
between a trace tr, a valuation θ, and a trace formula ϕ is defined as follows
(tr, θ)  ⊥ never
(tr, θ)  i  j iff θ(i) < θ(j)
(tr, θ)  i .= j iff θ(i) = θ(j)
(tr, θ)  t1 ≈ t2 iff t1θ =E t2θ
(tr, θ)  ¬ϕ iff not (tr, θ)  ϕ
(tr, θ)  ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff (tr, θ)  ϕ1 and (tr, θ)  ϕ2
(tr, θ)  F@i iff θ(i) ∈ idx(tr) and Fθ =E trθ(i)
(tr, θ)  (∃x : s).ϕ iff there exists u ∈ D(s) such that (tr, θ[x → u])  ϕ
Satisfaction of (∀x : s)ϕ, ϕ∨ψ and ϕ ⇒ ψ can be obtained from the cases above.
5.3 From Local Types to Local Formulas
Below we assume s is an established session between participants p and q. Given
k : temp and a trace formula ϕ, we write ϕ(k) to say that there is a fact F such
that F@k is an atom in ϕ. Below we assume that S is a subsort of msg.
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Definition 4 (Local Formula). Given a local type T and an endpoint s[p],
its local formula Φs[p](T ) is defined inductively as follows:
Φs[p](!〈q, S〉.T ) = ∃i, z.(out(spq, z)@i ∧ ψ(Φs[p](T ))
Φs[p](?(q, U).T ) = ∃i, z.(inp(spq, z)@i ∧ ψ(Φs[p](T ))
Φs[p](⊕〈q, {li : Ti}i∈I〉) = ∃i.
∨
j∈I(sel(spq, lj)@i ∧ ψ(Φs[p](Tj))
Φs[p](&(q, {li : Ti}i∈I)) = ∃i.
∨
j∈I(bra(spq, lj)@i ∧ ψ(Φs[p](Tj))
Φs[p](end) = ∃i.close@i.
where ψ(Φs[p](T )) := ∀k.(Φs[p](T )(k) ⇒ i  k)) the quantified variables have
sorts i, j, k : temp and z : S, and variables i and z are fresh. The extension
of Φ( ) to session environments, denoted ̂Φ( ), is as expected: ̂Φ(Δ, s[p] : T ) =
̂Φ(Δ) ∧ Φs[p](T ).
Remark 2. Since each local type is associated to a unique local formula, the
mapping Φ ( ) is invertible. That said, from a local formula ϕ we can obtain
the corresponding type Φ−1(ϕ). For instance, for the local formula ϕout :=
∃iz.(out(spq, z)@i ∧ ψ(Φs[p](T )), one has Φ−1(ϕout) = s[p] :!〈q, S〉.Φ−1s[p](ϕ′). The
other cases are similar.
The following theorems give a bi-directional connection between (a) well-
typednesss and (b) satisfiability of the corresponding local formulas (see [15]):
Theorem 4. Let Γ  P  Δ be a well-typed S process. Also, let tr ∈
traces(([P ])). Then there exists a θ such that (tr, θ)  ̂Φ(Δ).
Theorem 5. Let tr and ϕ be a trace and a local formula, respectively. Suppose
θ is an instantiation such that (tr, θ)  ϕ. Then there is a P ∈ S such that
Γϕ  P  Φ−1(ϕ) where Γϕ = {θ(x) : sort(x) | x ∈ dom(θ)}
Example 2. The projection of Ginit onto participant 3 (Buyer1), under session s
is: s[3] :!〈1, string〉.?(1, int).!〈2, int〉.&(2, {ok : (Gcontract|3),¬ok : end}).
The local formula associated is:
Φs[3](T ) = ∃i1, z1.out(s31, z1)@i1 ∧ (∃i2z2.inp(s31, z2)@i2 ∧ (∃i3z3.out(s32, z3))@i3
∧ (∃i4i5z4.((bra(s32, ok)@i4 ∧ Φs[3](T ′)) ∨ bra(s32,¬ok)@i4 ∧ close@i5)))
∧ ((i1 < i2 < i3 < i4 ∧ ψ(Φs[3](T ′))) ∨ (i1 < i2 < i4 < i5 ∧ ψ(Φs[3](T ′))))
where T ′ is the projection of Gcontract onto participant 3.
6 Revisiting the Two-Buyer Contract Signing Protocol
We recall the motivating example introduced in Sect. 2. Using a combination
of constructs from S and A, we first develop a protocol specification which is
compiled down to A using our encoding; the resulting A process can be then used
Relating Process Languages for Security and Communication Correctness 95
to verify authentication and protocol correctness properties in SAPIC/Tamarin.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding global types, and their associated local types
(obtained via projection following [10]).
An alternative approach to specification/verification would be as follows.
First, specify the protocol using S only, abstracting away from cryptography, and
using existing type systems for S to enforce protocol correctness. Then, compile
this resulting S specification down to A, where the resulting specification can be
enhanced with cryptographic exchanges and authentication properties can be
enforced with SAPIC/Tamarin.
6.1 Process Specification
Process specifications for Bi and S are as follows:
B1=a[3](y).y[3]!〈1, “Title”〉.y[3]?(1, x1).y[3]!〈2, x1 div 2〉.y[3]&(2, {ok : Bsct1 ,¬ok : 0})
B2 = a[2](y).y[2]?(1, x2).y[2]?(3, x3).ifx2 − x3 ≤ 99 then y[2] ⊕ 〈{1, 3}, ok〉.Bsct2
else y[2] ⊕ 〈{1, 3},¬ok〉.0
S = a[1](y).y[1]?(3, x1).y[1]!〈{2, 3}, quote〉.y[1]&(2, {ok : b[2](z).y[2]!〈〈1, y〉〉.z[2]?(1, x4).
y[1]!〈2, date〉.0,¬ok : 0}))
where processes Bsct1 and B
sct
2 , which implement the contract signing phase, are
as in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The specification for the trusted authority T
is as follows:
b[1](z).z[1]?((2, t)).νsk(T ); t[3]!〈{1, 2}, pk(sk(T ))〉.y[1]?(3, z2).y[1]?(2, z3).(νs)insert((s, init)).
(ν ct)t[3]!〈{1, 2}, ct〉.t[3]&({1, 2}, {abort :PTAb, res1 : PTR1 , res2 :PTR2 , success :z[1]!〈2, ok〉.0})}
where processes PTAb, P
T
R1
, and PTR2 are given in Tables 11 and 12. Process T
illustrates how we may combine constructs from S (important to represent, e.g.,
session establishment on b and delegation from S) and features from A (essential
to, e.g., manipulate the memory cell s, which records contract information).
Indeed, T uses the A construct insert to initialize the cell s and lookup as
to update it. Therefore, the sound and complete encoding proposed in Sect. 4
allows us to specify processes in A, while retaining the high-level constructs
from S.
To model the second phase of the protocol, we consider a Private Contract
Signature
Σpcs = {aenc( , ), senc( , ), pk( ), sk( ), pcs, sign, tsign, sdec(, ), adec(, ),
sconvert, tconvert, pcsver, sverif}
with function symbols for promises and signatures, and for verifying the validity
of exchanged messages. As for constructors: pcs(x, y, w, z) is the promise of x
to y to sign contract z given by w; sign(x, y) is the signature of x in z; pk(x)
is the public key of x; sk(x) is the secret key of x; aenc(x, y) is the asymmetric
encryption of y using key x; and senc(x, y) is the symmetric encryption of y using
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Table 9. Bsct1 : B1’s contract signing processes.[m]X denotes 〈m, sign(sk(x),m)〉
Table 10. Bsct2 : B2’s contract signing processes.
Table 11. PTAb: abort process executed by T
key x. Destructor sdec(, ) (resp. adec(, )) enforces symmetric (resp. asymmetric)
decryption; the other destructors (sconvert, tconvert, pcsver, sverif) are
defined from the rules in Epcs:
sdec(x, senc(x, y)) −→ y
adec(sk(x), aenc(pk(x), y)) −→ y
sver(pk(x), z, sign(x, z)) −→ true
tconvert(w, pcs(x, y, pk(w), z)) −→ sign(x, z)
pcsver(pk(x), y, w, z, pcs(x, y, w, z)) −→ true
sconvert(x, pcs(x, y, w, z)) −→ sign(x, z)
Table 13 shows the translation of B1 in A, using our encoding. For simplicity,
we omit the details related to the session establishment (using NSL), which follow
Table 7. Process specifications for B2, S, and T in A can be obtained similarly.
As mentioned in Sect. 4, the communication is done via updating session queues
sij , for i, j = 1, 2, 3.
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Table 12. PTres1 e P
T
res2 : resolve processes executed by T
Table 13. Translation of B1 into A.
6.2 Using SAPIC/Tamarin to Verify Authentication and Local
Session Types
We conclude this section by briefly discussing how to use our developments to
verify properties associated to authentication and protocol correctness.
Concerning authentication, we can use SAPIC/Tamarin to check the cor-
rectness of the authentication phase implemented by NSL. The proof checks
that events honest( ), sndnonce( , , ), rcvnonce( , , ), and rcvchann( , , ) occur
in the order specified by the encoding in Table 7. This way, e.g., the follow-
ing lemma verifies the correctness of the specification of the fragment of NSL
authentication with respect to participant B2:
lemma B2 NSL correctness :
exists − trace
(All pk12 pk1s pk2 pks #i #j #k #l.
honest(pk12)@i & honest(pk1s)@j & honest(pk2)@k & honest(pks)@l
=⇒ (Ex x y z s #j1 #k1 #l1.rcvnonce(pk12, pk2, x, y)@j1 & sndnonce(pk2, pk12, z)@k1
& rcvchann(pk12, pk2, s)@l1&j1 < k1 & k1 < l1))
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The lemma below says that the session channel exchanged using NSL is
secret. The proof relies on asymmetric-encryption, which is built in the
Tamarin library.
lemma Chann is secret :
(All pk12 pk2 pk1s pks s z n x y w z n2 #i #j #l #i1 #i2 #j1 #j2 #k1 #l1 #l2.
(honest(pk12)@i& honest(pk2)@j & honest(pk1s)@k & honest(pks)@l
& sndnonce(pk2, pk12, z)@i1 & rcvnonce(pk2, pk12, n, z)@j1& sndnonce(pk12, pk2, w)@i2
& rcvnonce(pk12, pk2, n2, w)@j2 & sndnonce(pks, pk1s, x)@i3 & rcvnonce(pks, pk1s, y, x)@j2
& sndchann(pk12, k2, s)@k1 & rcvchann(pk12, pk2, s)@k2 & sndchann(pk1s, pks, s)@l1
& rcvchann(pk12, pk2, s)@l2) =⇒ not(Ex #j. KU(s)@j))
We now consider properties associated to fidelity/safety of processes with respect
to their local types. The lemma below ensures protocol fidelity of B1 and B2 with
respect to the corresponding projections of the global type Ginit, presented in
Fig. 2. The corresponding local formula can be obtained following Definition 4:
lemma B1 B2 protocol fidelity :
exists − trace
(Ex x y z s #j #j1 #k #k1 #l.out(s31, x)@j & inp(s31, z)@k & out(s32, s)@l & j < k & k < l
& ((bra(s32, ok))@j1 & l < j1) | (bra(s32, ¬ok)@k1 & l < k1 & Φ(Gcontract|3))) &
(Ex x y z s #j #j1 #k #k1 #l. inp(s21, z)@k & inp(s23, s)@l & j < k & k < l
&((sel(s23, ok)@j1 & l < j1 & Φ(Gcontract|2)) | (sel(s23, ¬ok)@k1 & l < k1))
Using similar lemmas, we can also prove protocol fidelity for processes S and
T with respect to the projections of the global types presented in Fig. 2.
7 Related Works and Concluding Remarks
We have connected two distinct process models: the calculus S for multiparty
session-based communication [10] and the calculus A for the analysis of security
protocols [12]. To our knowledge, this is the first integration of sessions (in the
sense of [11]) within process languages for security protocol analysis. Indeed,
research on security extensions to behavioral types (cf. the survey [2]) seems to
have proceeded independently from approaches such as those overviewed in [7].
The work in [6] is similar in spirit to ours, but is different in conception and
details, as it uses a session graph specification to generate a cryptographic func-
tional implementation that enjoys session integrity. Extensions of session types
(e.g., [4,16]) address security issues in various ways, but do not directly support
cryptographic operations, global state, nor connections with “applied” languages
for (automated) verification, which are all enabled by our approach.
Our work should be mutually beneficial for research on (a) behavioral types
and contracts and on (b) automated analysis of security protocols: for the former,
our work enables the analysis of security properties within multiparty session
protocols; for the latter, our approach enables protocol specifications enriched
with high-level communication structures based on sessions. In ongoing work,
we have used SAPIC/Tamarin to implement our encodings and the verification
technique for communication correctness, based on local formulas (Definition 4).
Results so far are very promising, as discussed in Sect. 6.
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In future work, we intend to explore our approach to process specification
and verification in the setting of ProVerif [3], whose input language is a typed
applied π-calculus. We also plan to connect our approach with existing type
systems for secure information flow and access control in multiparty sessions [4].
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